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STONE GODS AND EARTHLY INTERESTS:
THE JURAL RELATIONS AND CONSEQUENCE OF
ATTRIBUTING LEGAL PERSONALITY TO HINDU IDOLS
Kartick Maheshwari & Vishnu Vardhan Shankar*
I

Introduction

Writings on the jurisprudence of persons are as old as writings on jurisprudence itself It is generally
assumed that persons lie at the heart of a legal system and legal theory. What it is to be a person, why
it matters that one is, and what are the implications of being a person are some of the peculiar
questions that come to be asked when trying to decipher personality.' The law, it is said, is made for
the sake of persons.' Therefore, understanding legal persons is crucial for understanding the law
The understanding of persons has not remained static 3 The law has moved from recognising only
some members of the human race as persons to recognising even artificial persons as capable of
having a will and mind of their own:' Law today recognises companies, corporation soles-and even
Hindu Idols as being juristic persons. However, as the understanding of persons has expanded to
include such artificial persons, a number of crucial conceptual issues have remained unanswered.
Theories applicable to natural persons are not readily applicable to artificial persons. Even where such
theories are sought to be applied, jurists disagree about their exact application.' Therefore, an enquiry
into the philosophical and legal nature of certain artificial persons would enrich the study of legal
personality in general. This paper will attempt to address this need by examining the legal personality
of a Hindu Idol.
While the personality of the Idol has impacted a wide swathe of legal concepts, this paper focuses on
just a few of therm The interface of tax and property law in the context of the Hindu Idol is not only
important for a variety of reasons but also poses some difficult questions- For instance, the economic
importance of the Hindu Idol can be judged by the fact that the estimated value of property held by
Hindu Idols in the State of Tamil Nads alone runs to crores of rupees.' The task of its management
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is so complex that a separate department of the State government, the Department of Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments, is entrusted with this task, and that too only in respect of a
part of such properties. Since the personality of the Idol with its origin in Hindu legal philosophy
does not easily fit into conventional theories of personality, this poses significant difficulty when the
personality of the Idol interfaces with modern tax, trust or property law. As will be examined
subsequently, this interface is not smooth and has resulted in some anomalous consequences as well
as some uncertainty. Therefore, not only does the personality of the Idol need examinanon, but its
position in a modern legal system also needs scrutiny
The personality of the Hindu Idol is something of an oddity in the Indian legal system. It is
essentially ancient Hindu legal philosophy juxtaposed with and given recognition by an alien legal
system-the English common law. Theories of legal personality evolved in the western
jurisprudential context are not readily applicable to the personality of the Idol.' Similarly, the ancient
Hindu law understanding of the legal status of an Idol appears anachronistic when applied in a
modern day society.' For instance, the notion in ancient Hindu philosophy that the Idol's status was a
result of the collective belief and devotion of Hindu worshippers is not easily understood by
contemporary legal theory. Therefore, this unique problem of the personality of the Hindu Idol also
provides a golden opportunity for pushing the boundaries of the theories of personality by
permitting original thinking on personality itself. Part II of this paper tries to examine the theoretcal
contours of the legal personality of the Idol and thereby tries to find a theory suitable to explain its
unique personality.
Part III of the paper, an attempt to go beyond mere legal theory, examines the practical and material
significance of the juristic personality of the Idol. It is felt that for the progress of society and for the
development of the law in general, a practical understanding of legal personality is crucial." This
point is still more pertinent in the context of the Hindu Idol. Hindu law, despite some unusual
modifications as a consequence of its interface with the common law, continues to be in force. Also,
with the difficulties involved in evolving a secular common law for all Indians, it would continue to be
relevant, at least in the near future. The Hindu Idol has impacted concepts as diverse as property,
taxation, trusts and liability in Hindu legal philosophy." Therefore, a proper understanding of the
Hindu Idol would shed much light on the very foundations of Hindu law itself

II

The Hindu Idol as a Juristic Person: The Method and Justification for its

Personality
A

Examining the Concept of Juristic or Legal Personality

As admitted by Max Radin, in ordinary literature and in common speech, "person" means a human
being, but as a technical term in law, "person", it could be insisted, did not mean a human being but a
group of legal relationships." In the course of this article, it is this view that we shall find embodied
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in the person of the Hindu Idol. Moreover, in support of Radin, it is strongly contended that the very
words "juristic person" connote recognition of an entity to be a person in law, which otherwise it is
rot. Salmond in his seminal work Jurrprudencealso advocates a similar view, where he notes that a
legal or juristic "person" is any subject matter other than a human being, to which the law attributes
personality Therefore, from these views it flows that "persons" are the subjects of which rights and

duties are the attributes. It is only in this respect that persons possess juridical significance, and this
is the exclubive point of view from which personality receives legal recognition." Thus, this
extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personality beyond the class of
human beings, is held as one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination. 5
A charitable endowment is one example of the application of the concept of personality, and in
recognition of it the Roman law developed two kinds of juristic persons. One was a corporation or an
aggregate of persons that owed its juristic personality to State sanction. A private person might make
over property by way of gift or legacy to a corporation already in existence, and might at the same
time prescribe the purpose for which the property was to be employed." The recipient corporation
would be in the position of a trustee and would be legally bound to spend the funds for the particular
purpose. The other alternative for the donor was to create an institution or foundation himself. This
would be a new juristic person that depended for its origin upon nothing else but the will of the
founder, provided that it was directed to a charitable purpose. In the eyes of law, the foundation
would be the owner of the dedicated property, and the administrators would be in the position of
trustees who are bound to carry out the object of the foundation." In this manner, the idea of
joristic personality came to be recognised in Roman law, which was subsequently followed by other
societies.

1

4 RoscoE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 192-193 (1959) Thereinafter PoND. He notes that the emergence of such entities
coincided with the development of complex modern societies where an individuAls interactions fell short and were
inadequate to facilitate social development, necessitating the cooperation of a larger circle of individuals. As a resul,
Constitutions of States, municipal corporations, companies etc. are all creations of the law and these "juristic persons"
arose out of necessities in human development, In other words, they were dressed in a cloak to be recognised in law to be
a legal unit.
As Professor Radin, rightly points out, a proper appreciation of Professor Hohfeldb analysis of legal relations is
instructive while studying personality, see RADiM, snpra note 11, at 650. This will be apparent in this article while anilysing
the jural relations of the Hindu Idol in the context of the different theories of personality. See alfo WN. HO-FELD,
FtlNDAENTA. LEGAL CONCEPIONS (1964).
See SALNOND, tpr note 4, at 299, 306 for the view that there are two essentials of a legal person, which are the smpes and
the animnr. The capsrs is the body into which the law infuses the anma, will or intention of a fictitious personality
IMidat 305

See genera/4 ANDREW BoRKOWSM, TExTBOOK ON RoMAN Lw 85-86 (2002). It will be pertinent to note that in later Roman
law, gifts creating charitable institutions were authorised by the State (only if they took the form of Pa Casa i.e., were
devoted to 'pious uses'). The State sanction to clothe such institutions with the capacity of a juristic person was impliedly
given.
See Sons, INSTrrUES OF RoALAN LAW 195-199 (1934) e.

LK, MunERJEA, THE HiNno LAw oF Racious AND CHARITABLE

TasTs 11 (1952) [hereinafter B.K. MuKERJEA, REicToUs TRusTs).
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The Role and Nature of Legal Personality in Hindu Law

As opposed to Roman law, there is no similar conception of legal personality in English Law; English
law recognises only one class of artificial legal persons via, the corporations that are really
personification of groups or series of individuals. These are classified into the corporation aggregate
and the corporation sole." Thus, neither a Hindu religious institution nor a Hindu Idol can come

within the scheme of artificial persons as perceived by English law. The problem is further
accentuated by the fact that Hindu taw recognises the appropriation of any kind of wealth to objects
of religion and charity, and its two chief vehicles are in the form of endowments to an Idol or
religious institutions." There was thus the dilemma of applying English Common law to the
personality of the Hindu idol, which was answered by West, J in Manobar Ganesh Tambekar v.

Lakbmiram GoiindranA:
"...The Hindu law, Ake the Roman law and those derived from it, recognisvs not oat coporate
bodies with nghts of propeitv vested in the corporationapartfrom its indeidualmembers, but
also thejuridicalpersonscalledfoundations. Thes a trust is not necessary in Hindu law though
it mcy be required underEnglisb law..
Consequently, the Hindu Idol is a juridical subject and the pious idea of the donors/worshippers,
which it embodies is given the status of a legal person and is deemed capable in law of holding
property in the same way as a natural person. More importantly, a Hindu Idol is founded,
consecrated, and endowed on the basis of the religious customs of the Hindus and in recognition
thereof by courts of laxW a jurisne entity.
It is submitted that Hindu religious institutions like muttr," cboulres and other establishments bear a
striking resemblance to the description of foundations in Roman law The idea is the same, namely
when property is dedicated for a particular purpose, the property upon which the purpose is

impressed, is itself raised to the category of a juristic person so that the dedicated property would
vest in the person so created. In the Hindu debutterf' it is seen that the position is slightly different

.
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(1888) L.L.R 12 Borm. 247, referred to with approval in ShiromaniGmrhdkwm Prbandbak Committee v SmNNotDos, (2000) 4
SC.C. 146, 160 where the Supreme Court recognised the Holy Book of the Sikhs, the Gunt Gran/h Sabi as a juristc
person. On the other hand, it is debarable whether a mosque could be considered 2s a juristic person in India. Initially, in
ApMid Shwhid GQ4f & Ohen v. Shiremoni Garadnwra Prahhawk ommit, Awkhar A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 369 (RB), a Full
Bench of thie Labore High Court held that a mosque was a juristic person. However, when dius decision was taken in
appeal to the Privy Council in The Ma/idKown as MaidkShahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gunwara Parbhandak Commineer,(193940) 67 Ind. App. 251 (PC.), the Judicial Committee, after studying its own previous opinions in great detail opined chat
suits cannot he brought by or against mosques as they are not artificial persons in the eye of the law
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(18BB) 1.LR. 12 Born. 247, cf Sbiremni GndmiPrandhkCommieerv Sam Na/b Dos, (200G) 4 &CC. 146, 160.
This doctrine is firmly established in Hindu law For a detailed discussion on this point, see generall 1 Hau Stion GCoua.
THE HINDU Con 630-711 (1998).
The Supreme Court in Sarawgem sria Maam v. Romarimm Goaedar, A.1 R, 1966 C- 1603, held that a "mull' was the owner
of the endowed property. The milwas found to be a juristic person and thus could own, acquire or possess any property
The Idol is called depua, 'deity. The property dedicated to it is called dvtteraw in Anglo Indian argon 'debutter.' For a
detailed exposioon on this point, see J.D.M. Daanrr, RiuioN Law AND STrrr iN INDiA 484 (1969, 1999 Reprnt)
|hereinafter DnERumr, RELIGION & LAw].
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from the Roman position, and in such cases, it is not the whole endowment but only the Idol, which,
as an embodiment of the foundation, is looked upon as the juristic being in which the debutter
property vests. The reasons for this need to be elaborated, since juristic personality is a mere creation
of law and has its origin in a desire for doing justice by providing, as it were, centres for jural
relations. In this context, it will be illuminating to quote the view taken by the Madras High Court
while recognising the juristic personality of the Hindu Idol in T'idapurna Tirtha Si
v ianidhi
Tirtha .wamPn:
'It is to give die effect to such a sentiment, addepreadand deep-rooted as it has always been, with
reference to something not capable of holdingpropery as a naturalperson, that the knws of most
countries have sanctionedthe creation of afciousperson in the matter...'
Going back to Salmond, it is pertinent to note that personality 'may be of as many kinds
considers proper,' and the choice of the corpus into which the law shall breathe the
fictitious personality is more a matter of form than of' substance? All these views were
account by the Privy Council in deciding the landmark case of Pramatha Nah Mullick v
KIumarMul/ick, 8 where the Judicial Committee found that:

as the law
breath of
taken into
Pradymna

". A Hindu Idol is, accordbg to long established authorit, spon the rekgious customs of the
Hindus, and the recognition thereof by Courtsof Law a /urirticentity. It has ajuri&calstatus
with the power of suing and being sued... it is unnecessarato quote the authoritier for this doctrine
thus sjimh stated is "Im:established.
Subsequent judicial rulings, even as recently as 1999 have followed this dictum and there has been
widespread endorsement of the principles laid down in this case, Jurists have commended the
decision for not applying Western judicial thoughts or common law to Eastern religions and instead
relying upon the ability to carry out to their logical conclusion principles of Hindu law itself, a system
which, wit its complexity and subtlety, often puzzles the keenest judicial intellect.Foe these reasons

2

(1904) 14 Mad. L.J. 105. The "sentiment" which the Court here refers to, is the belief of the worshipers in the personality
of the Idol, and thus the attendant gifts bestowed upon the Idol. Citing POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISronY or ENGISH
LAw, the Court went on to observe, 'Perhaps the oldest of alljairdeperrossir teGod,hero or the

sait.

Ibid.at 109-110.
27

SALMtoNo, rspra note 4, at 308.

2

(1924-25) 52 Ind. App. 245 (PC.) [hereinafter PrantatbaNath Ml&kir casej. The question here was whether one of the
three brothers, who were joint shebaits of an Idol located in a house built by a previous shebail, was entitled to remove the
deity to his own house during his turn of worship. (At this juncture it may suffice to state that a shbait is a natural person
through whom the Idols rights and duties vis-i-vis its property are realised.) In deciding rho question, the judicial
Committee while recognising the juristic personality of the Hindu Idol, opined that the will of the Idol with respect to
location, expressed through a disinterested next friend should be taken into account.
[hbd at 250, per Lord Shaw (emphasis supplied)A long catena of cases have followed this decision, see for instance, the recent decision of the Supreme Court of India in
Raw Jank4'o Drly nv Stair of Bihar, (1999) 5 S.C.C. 50, where the Court found no reason to disturb the principles laid down

here.
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some have even gone as far as to call this pronouncement 'masterly"' Thus, the law as it stands now
is clear and in complete unanimity: the Idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of
the donor is a juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person, the dedicated property
Vests-

C

Are the Theories of Juristic Personality Capable of Explaining the Personality of
the Hindu Idol?

The task of legal theory is to explore the institutions of legal systems and understand die manifold
practical situations and problems that arise in them.' Therefore, through the kaleidoscope of legal
theories, an attempt to understand the jural relations of the institution of the Hindu Idol will now be
undertaken. In practice however, the courts have refused to commit themselves to any single theory
about the nature of legal personality?' This appears to be because no single theory is capable of
solving the problems of personality fully. One of the possible reasons for this gap between theory
and practice is that theonsts have kept themselves more occupied with either a philosophical
explanation of legal personality or trying to fit it in with some political ideology, rather than
concentrating their attention to practical problems. The Fiction theory and the Realist (or Organic)
theory of legal personality will now be considered, and it will be interesting to see if any of them
conform to the principles laid down in PramahaNathMullkcase.

AD.B Keith, The Personaiy of an Idol, JoURNAL oF CuaLaATjvE
iEGErATION
AND INTRNAtIOINA
30 CAln1A WEicLx NOTrs 48, 49 (1925-26) [hereinafter KEJTH]. In a point aside, Professor G.

SSee

L.kw as reproduced in,
Ajjappa in the authors'
discussions with him notes that this is the only Indian case, which finds mention in the treatises of eminent urists such as
Salmond, Pound, Lloyd and Friedmann, thereby indicating its jurisprudential importance. For a contrasting view and a
scathing criticism of this decision, see S.G. Vesey-Fitzgerald, Idolm For, 41 LAwc QUARts-seY REv;. 419 (1925) [hereinaftrer
F[TZGERA.n], where the author found it significant that in this very case the High Court counsel pleaded that the Idol was
more chattel, and it was left to the English judges to uphold its personality Professor Fitzgerald argues, 'Bd if the Idolis
God if' it Is nra a ahide for 16e gnme of God, then sare6 ar asapayngDainity a mrg poor rophment enassppo-ing hatiit nerdr ie aid
of the Prin Co0nn/ t prect its ag/sn. Arguing on grounds of utility and jurisprudence, he urges that the English principle
of a trusL for charitable purposes, the property being vested in the shebvitr as alternating trustees, should have been
extended to India as well, because, 'Fhat pinpower of lan areserned by prtrsa g the Idol uhids art ot as Al or better srarl y a
afst? Hlowv'er appealing this argument may be, it is submitted that such a viewpoint is not well grounded in Hindu legal

philosophy upon which the personality of the Idol rests. As will be examined later, the English law of trusts would be
Inappropriate in its application to the Idol. In fact where the concept of trusteeship is applied to an Idol the consequences
are anomalous, see lfra note 95 and accompanying text.
"

See W F alsoaiANN, LEat. THiEoRY 572 (5

cdn, 1967, 1999 Indian Reprint) [hereinafter .Pauoi

esN].

The following two case studies illustrate the varying stance taken by courts in applying the Fiction and Realist theories in
similar situations. The application of the Fiction theory can be seen in the U.S. case of People'r Pleartre Pars v: Roblai; 63
S.E. 981 (1908), where there was a lease agreement that forbade leasing a park to coloured persons. This lease was given to
a corporation, which had only coloured persons as its members. Consequently the following question arose; whether a
corporation is a coloured pcrson because its members are? It was declared that the corporation was not a coloured person,
as it had a separate legal personality from its members, which was, by its very nature, incapable of being designated as
coloured and its will was independent from that of its members. In sharp contrast, an apt application of the Realist
theory can be seen in the fmous case of Oainental Tyre Co . Daixzlnr Ca, 11915] 1 KB. 893, where a company
incorporated in England was held by the House of Lords to be an enemy corporation for purposes of trading wid the
eNrey, as all its shares were in German hands. Adhering to the Realist tenets, Lord Bucdey fuund the Daimler Company
to be sn enemy German because the 'artificial legal entity has no power of motion it is moved ha the will of its German
mermbers', thus holding that the Company and its German members had a common will and enjoyed the same legal
personality
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The Fiction Theory
The fiction theory was first expounded by the jurist Savigny, and counts Salmond among its principal
supporters. The fiction theory regards the legal personalities of entities other than human beings to
be the result of a fiction. It holds that a personality is attached to groups and institutions by pure legal
fiction, and as "real" personality can attach to individuals alone, this personality is distinct from the
personality of the individual beings. Accordingly, States, corporations, and institutions cannot be the
subject of rights and persons, but are treated as if they were persons?' Thus, the fiction theory
simply asserts that some groups and institutions are regarded as if they are persons and does not find
it necessary to answer why this is so. However, the value of the fiction theory les in the fact that it
starts from a natural, extra-juristic conception of personality, as founded in ethics and religion, and
then adds that certain groups and institutions determined by law, though lacking in the supreme
quality, i.e. human dignity, are nevertheless treated by law as if they were human persons."
If this theory is applied to a Hindu Idol, at first glance it will be easy to come to the conclusion that
an Idol is a legal person because the law prescribes it as such. In PramathaNath Mddick' case, Lord
Shaw remitted the case to a lower court so that the Idol could appear through a disinterested next
friend, and permitted the Idol to make representations regarding the change of its place of ordinary
worship during one of the turns (of worship) by one branch of the family?' Commenting on this, the
urist PW Duff, a proponent of the fiction theory remarked that "it ir hardro doubt that there isfiction in
the air."' To buttress this claim, he adds that:
.Lord Shaw did not beleve that the Idolrcold expres its ill or had any will to express;
therefore the law or the court must appoint someone whose dedaraenosof the Idfr msi should be
deemed to be the Idls own dedarain... '"
In support of the application of the fiction theory, in a previous case the Privy Council upheld the
personality of an Idol and admitted that it is 'only in an ideal (i.e., fictitious) sense' that property is
held by an Idol and that the practice has been by no means uniform. However, Lord Hobhouse,
whose judgment in this case uses the most exalted language about the personality of the Idol," finds

See FRIDAmIAN%,
supra note 32, at 556-557. To pus it in Sarigny's wards: "All law dxistsfr he ake of a Abr
indnident threfory dhv oad awaptvo
of personabt aman oidsde iilh the idea o

inbena in each

Woter, sapm note 3 at 507. See also S, Rajendra Babu, J.s opinion (dissenting on this point) in Asistant Cowmissioner a
V/ppa Texdles, 2003 (7) SCALE 530: (2003) 11 S-CC. 405, where he writes s 536 (SCALE), that a "... ompaq it.. I
rk of the lA by pumsm of fton and
piweit6iasl kx oranmisatio, Wih~h is ainWsiedtiWst the pre-ehng iwonM&PdxiastiAwu
andgr with a namua person..
(1924-25) 52 Ind. App. 245, 261(RC).
See P.W Duff, The Peroswfof
afn

dd,

3 CAAm.

L JouN. 42,45 (11927)

|hereinafter Durt].

See P.W Dur, PERSONAIAuY LNROMAN PuvxE LAw 212 (1938). However, Professor Duff's assertions applying the fiction
theory to an Idol are contested by the noted authority on Hindu isw, Professor Natnraja Ayyaz in, A.S. Nuaaia Ayyar, The
Permalo of DA*s in inds Lo;A 3 VAVAIuAA NimNAVA 101,, 174 (1954) [hereinafter ArmA]. In his sharp rebuttal
to Professor Doff. he conrends that to those who are familiar with conflict of interest and duty among the group of
rearkes and servants administering to the needs of the Temple Idol and among the group of supervisors in Trusts, the
apperanrce of a disinterested nets friend would appear quite narursl and justified.

Juner

SThakar Dmsje' is the name of the deity embodied in the idol in the above case of Gessamer Sin G nvrarere v
Runran/4r Gosnanre (189-89) 16 1ad- App- 137 (RC).
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as a fact that there was "...no possession of the Thakoor (the Idol) adverse to the plainiff til May, 1881..

It is submitted that a juridical person, not to say divinity, over whom a title could be acquired 'by
adverse possession is a novelty that will make even a lay man sit up and notice the absurdity of law 4 '
Vesey-Fitzgerald has come up with another sharp rebuttal - that if the fiction theory of juristic
persons is right, then the Thakoor is as good a person as say, the President of India, since both are
fictions.
The fiction theory emphasises that a legal personality such as a corporation, being only a fiction' has
no body to be kicked and no soul to be damned, no will and no mind but only such life as the law and
statutes infuse into it. However, in sharp contrast to these tenets, an Idol by virtue of being a juristic
personality has the power to sue as well as being burdened with the liability of being sued.' In yet
another divergence from the fiction theory, it is a recognised principle that an Idol has a will of its
own, which is expressed through its sbebait, acting in the deity% best interests, or maybe even a next
best friend appointed by the court. Thus, it is submitted that the fiction theory only partly explains

the juristic personality of an Idol, and as a whole, the theory is not applicable to the juristic
personality of a Hindu Idol.
The Realist or Organism Theory
This theory was first elaborated by Gierke and its prominent sympathizers include Maidand and
Geldart. " Unlike the fiction theory, it assumes that the subject of rights need not be human beings,
that every being which possesses a will and a life of its own may be the subject of rights, and that
States, corporations and foundations are beings just as alive and as capable of having a will as human

S

aidt147, per Lord Hobhouse.

Se FrracFRAT 0,

spra note

31, at 422.

4'

Id

^

As noted by Greer, LJ, in Sepney Corpe. v Osof-ky, [1937) 3 All ER. 289, 291 (CA), Sr also S RaLjcndra Babu, J's opinion
(dissenting on this point) in Aricant Commisisnrr v Ve1ppa Textil; 2003 (7) SCALE 530: (2003) 11 S.C.C 405,
[hereinafter Vlkappa Texdk, where he writes at 537 (SCALE), ".ina
lis (mwns na con hne
banhibaedto ajmrirdcptraonis
or ffiadl I&acapi ibcpopoidon of

"

fadshing a

"ompay'..'

Another fallacy is that if a juristic personality, such as a corporation has no real will, it must have a fictitious will, and a
will imposed by the law can effect only lawful ends and can act only within a sphere strictly delimited 1b law. As a result,
the fiction theori breaks down when a court is examining a tort or crime involving malice or mouve. This is because a
non-existent thing certainly cannot be malicious or acting with motive, because according to this theory, a has no will of
its own. In this context see the dicia of Lord Lindley in $Cidge 1ifeAsrance Brow, (1904] A.C. 426 and of S. Rajendra
Babu, J., (dissenting on this point) in Ve/appa Texfik at 533-557(SCALE). However, there is now a long line of case law
where modern corporations have been held liable for torts and crimes involving ments rea. It is here that the realist theory
steps in, because it advocates that a corporation being a real entity it may have a mind of its own, and therefore be guilty
of malicious prosecution or libel. For a detailed discussion on this point, see JONATHAN CLOUGH, CORPORATE CRIMINAL
Liar'rxr 76-77 (2002). The reason for this analysis is that the liability of the estate of an Idol for wrongs committed by
the sheits in the reasonable management of its properties has been held analogous to the liability of the Corporation for
wrongs committed by its agents in the course of their employment and for the apparent furtherance of its purpose. See
PrarndNath Ra9 v Pooran Chandra Ray, (1906) I.L.R. 35 Cal. 691, 699, where these sentiments have been expressed.
However, the criminal liability of H-indu Idols is one area that needs greater examination. For an indicanon as to some of
the difficult questions that may need to be clarified, see Li-a note 130.
See W.M. Geldart, Ip/Permuakg, 27 LAw QuARrEsn- REv. 90 (1911)

(hereinafter GELDART.

See Worrr, %pranote 3, at 498 for the view that the primary assertion of the theory is that 'juristic persons' enjoy a real

existence as a group. See also R.WM. DIAs, JURIsPRuDENCE- 269 (1985).

53

Student Bar Review

Vol. 16

2004

beings." It further urges that the emergent personality of groups must be recognised by law as a real
entity, which is just as real as the individual human personality, and its aims include preserving the
autonomy of existing groups within the State? Thus, what this really leads to is that any group within
the State, be it a church, an educational or charitable foundation, a profit making company, a trade
union, or even a mere social club, is entitled to claim legal recognition of its personality without the
need for any official grant or concession of legal personality." This runs counter- to the general
approach of most legal systems which holds that since group or 'corporate' personality is a legal
49
privilege-it can only come into existence by express grant of the State.
This theory terms the corporate body to be a reate Verbandsperson i.e., it does not owe its personality to
state recognition, it is not a fictitious legal creation, nor does it personally reside in its component
members or beneficiaries" This theory essentially boils down to saying that a group has a real will,
real mind, and real power of action. A corporation has all the characteristics of a natural person and
its actions are its own. It is just that the corporate will Mf the corporation expresses itself through the
acts of its members, servants and agents, who are essendally its organs, due to which this thcory is
also called the Organism doctrine. Thus, it contends that there is no legal fiction attached here since
it is independent of its recognition by the State; every group comes to have a personality of its own,
whether that group is a social group or a political one.
It is submitted that the realist theory best explains the personality of a Hindu Idol. The reasoning
behind this proposition is that to the endower and the worshippers, the Idol is real, and they believe in
the personality of the deity who is embodied in the Idol? In addition, the Idol has a real will of its
own which it expresses through its shebait, who has the power to sue and be sued in the Idol's name,
and who can rent out, encumber or dispose the Idol's assets if that is advantageous to the Idol-all
4

ento,

ifpra note 12, at 241-242,

DENNus L-iv, Ti IeA or LAw 302 (1964). However, this is only possible once it has so organised itself as to make
manifest it separate identity as an institution distinct from its members.
4.

Such an approach has been termed the 'oncCssion' theory,

see GFT oARr, sqpr

note 45, at 92.

See FRIEDMANN, supar note 32, at 559.
In this context it will be helpful to refer to the dicta of Lord Denning in R.L Boean (LBginoing) Co. Lid v. JGiaham C
Ssr lId, [1956] 3 All R.L 624, 630 (C.A.) where he held tha"A
coayean;y may in many sas be likened to a Inwan hm
p
bd
They a/bo han a bmi and a ner centre nid enrols what they do They also hawe banes hich boild the taok and act in acordncrnith
dciesnfroin the wano. Athe sate of mndof
m
herv managerr is the stale of meind if the company and it treated he she law as sob...."
Similar is the ma arity opinion of Srikrisha, J., in -eapp Tetile at 538-539 (SCALE), ... /th carrentjndikalthinie
appears to ho that the tan rna of tbe person in-charge of the ajfin of the corporadon, the a/er ego, is Rable ho be extrapolated to the
eorporatin,enabling ev n artiic/alpersontolheprosaeted.
The realist theory does not however address all the difficulties
thrown up by juristic persons. In Vellippa Toeik, the Supreme Court wos faced with a piquant situation whete a
corparation (in its own name) was sought to be prosecuted for an offense, which prescribed a inandatory sentence of
imprisonment, if convicted. Since unlike a natural person, a corporation cannot be physically detained, the court was
compelled to discharge the corporation from prosecution for offences that required ouch kind of punishment,
In support of such a stance, se AYvvt, sopor note 38, at 172, where the learned author evidences an inscription which is
recorded at Lord Vieswwarn temple at Bansaras to show that the Idol had been held as 'real' during the ages of Indian
history.
The Idol has even been held liable for trcspass, seePramodNathRay v Pooran CbandraRay, (11908) I.L.. 35 Cal. 691, where
the Court found that if the shelbit in the prudent management of the property of the Idol uintentionally commits a
trespass, he thereby renders the Idol's estate liable for damages. It is submitted that this case essentially treats the shebail as
an organ of [he Idol, and is a clear illustration of the organiarn doctrine.
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of which are virtues found in a real person, Its personality is on the basis of the deity, who is
thought to he embodied in it, as a result of which the group or the believers of that deity revere it,
and the group is thought to be the true beneficiaries; an essential principle of the realist theory. It is
also capable of acquiring and holding property like any other person, natural or artificial. Mote
importantly, rather than state recognition, the faith of its worshippers is enough to confer a juristic
personality on the Idol. Recognising the fact that this collective belief of followers is enough to
acknowledge the existence of juristic personality, the Supreme Court has noted.
It is enough #' the detotees or the pilgrimsfeel that there is some super human poner which
they should wrship and invoke its blessings.-. "
D

Understanding the Hindu Idol in Relation to the Corporation Sole

It is essential to mention another type of western jurisprudential concept, primarily of English origin,
namely the corporation sole. It is crucial to examine whether its personality enjoys a similar position
in law to that of a Hindu Idol, and whether as a result, the Hindu Idol is a carrier of a similar set of
jural relations. A corporation sole is generally an officer, and the rights and duties attached to the
office are regarded as separate from the incumbent who occupies the office. These rights and duties
accrue to the successor in office, and corporation sole are found only when the successive holders of
some public office are incorporated, so as to constitute a single and permanent legal person 53
The concept of corporation sole has its roots in the Churches of England. Church property did not
fit in any of the other categories of property at that time, and this necessitated the creation of a new
concept. If a man gave his property to a church or a monastery, he gave it to the patron saint.
Gradually, the saint retired behind his church and now the Church rather than the saint is thought of
as the holder. A human being or a group of human beings, often said to be perpetual, managed the
property? In the course of time, this concept was extended to the temporal sphere, where the most
prominent example is the Crown. This led to the creation of notions like 'the King never dies. 'the
King is never under age' and 'the King can do no wrong.
In this aspect, a corporation sole seems very similar to the personality of a Hindu Idol. The property
meant for the deity actually vests in the Idol. Here, those who are in possession of the Idol, i.e., the
shehairs of the Idol, or the temple where the Idol resides, enjoy the management of the property
dedicated to the deity as the agents of the Idol, and also the rights and liabilities which are attached as
a consequence of holding this office.' Like the corporation sole, the Idol also seems to have
perpetual succession. In the opinion of B.K. Mukerjea, J. even if an Idol is destroyed or damaged, a

a

Se Ram fankije Deigy a State of Biber, (1999) 5 S.C.C. 50, 59 citing approvingy from, Addangi Ngenwra Rao
Askannva Dectha Temple, (1973) Andh. W. R, 379 (A.P.).

V

1i

SL.ssoNo, tupra note 4, at 308.

Pou ocK, ripranote 18, at 487. At this point, it should be recalled that a corporation sole consists of one person at a time
as opposed to a corporation aggregate, which consirss of a group of people
iNd. at 495-496.
These agents of the Idol may also have perpetual succession which they derive from the Idol. An apt illustration to this
effect can be seen in the office of the Shankarachrya i.e, the pontiffs of the four leading twats founded by the Adi
Sbhakarehea, where on the death of the incumbent Shankracharya, a new one is appointed who takes over the
preexisdng rights and liabilities of the amit and its Idols.
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new Idol can be consecrated again, which enjoys the same rights and liabilities as the previous Idol
after following the requisite ceremonial procedures."' The point raised by B.K. Mukerjea, J can be
elaborated with the example of the famous Lord Jagannath, whose Idol resides in the mtt established
by the AdShankarachaqra in Puri, Orissa. Here, according to Hindu custom, the Idol is changed every

twelve years, and a new Idol is put in place of the previous Idol.' It makes- no difference as to the
veneration with which the new Idol is held and the properties, rights and liabilities of the previous
Idol are simply transferred to the new image. This is exactly like a change of office in the corporation
sole, where the new officer retains all the rights, properties and privileges that were held by the
previous office bearer in the capacity of the office.
However, it is submitted that the idea of the juristic personality of an Idol being equated with a
corporation sole is too far-fetched and Indian law recognises the corporation sole only if created by
statute. Examples of corporation sole include the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies' or the
President of India, who have been conferred such a position by statutory enactment or constitutional
provision. Under each such name as mentioned above, two persons live. One is a human being, the
natural person who administers the duties of the office for the time being. He alone is visible to the
eyes of a layman. The other is a fictitious being of the law and he is the true occupant of the office.
The living official comes and goes, but this creation of the law perpetually remains the same. The
presence of a natural person is necessary because for the office to continue without intermission, a
successor is required, who must be a natural person. An Idol, it may be feebly defended, also enjoys
such perpetual succession, but the absence of a natural person, along with the absence of any statute
in its favour, is a definite impediment to confer upon it the status of corporation sole.

III Ancient Personality, Modern Problems: The Practical Implications of the
Idol as a Juristic Person
A

Why the Idol's Personality has Material Implications...

Having established the legal personality of the Idol, it must be emphasised that the personality of the
Idol poses not merely jurisprudential questions but also has practical consequences. The practical
implicatinns of the personality of the Idol may be traced back to two contradictory strands of
thinking on the Idol. The Idol is said to be a juristic person capable of owning an estate absolutely in
its own capacity. The properties are managed by the shebail or the manager. On the other hand, it is
also stated that the shebait has a proprietary interest in the property. The siebaid,it has been held, must
have some inherent value. Therefore, this proprietary interest of the shebalt is not merely in the

See B.K MULniJrUA, Racnious Tstus, ntpra note 17, it 158-159.
This is done during a festival cated the fesaval of the new body, 'nabo kakker.' Here the old wooden images are replaced
bw new wooden images and according to custom the old deities 'die' and new ones are 'born. For an exposition of this
cusrom, see Frederique Apifeil, RnJ&athrinPra, orRiGION IN INDIA (LN. Mada ed., 1999) at 199.
For a discussEn

in

this

point, ae UP State Coopmnakw "ad Denkparent Bank Ltd v Chandra EMon Dzday, (1999) 1

S.C.C.

741.
Se AngurbaM . DebabriAe AIR. 1951 SC 293- Iadoeda v Pascholk, AT R 1953 S.C 125 Jamb Ram Pandit r
Koba onandonProwdi, A.R. 1961 Parna 293. But fr a cmatra view see the arguments made in Rishindra Nath Sarkar, Hira
Seby or Maad PNptriaryRk in Endonwlat? A.I.R. (j0ouN.) 91 (1954)[hereinafter Sara].
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rdubaid but also in the assets of the Idol itself. As a result, while the Idol owns the properties held by
it, certain natural persons also have an interest over the property. The consequence of this dichotomy
is that it allows endowments to an Idol to become an ideal device for tax avoidance. The use of the
Idol for tax avoidance is not a recent phenomenon-it has a chequered eight hundred year history. 4
The local Hindu kings gave significant tax concessions for land dedicated for local temples or Idols
in much the same way as the Income Tax Act, 1922 (unamended). Lands dedicated to Idols were
either exempted from tax, or taxed at a significantly lower rate." An avenue for tax avoidance thus
came to be created.

The endowers in the thirteenth century operated much in the same manner as today's shebaits. Income
from land dedicated to the local temple or Idol was accounted as spent on maintaining the Idol in line
with the spiritual wishes of the endower. In reality, this was not the case. Even a cursory examination
of the stone inscriptions"7 or accounts maintained by shebaits today shows that such expenditure was
fanciful and unreal." The real expenditure was incurred on maintaining the shebait and his family Nut
just the shebaits, but even Hindu priests have sought to profit from being associated with a temple or
Idol." As is the case even today, there appears to have been no social sanction or sacrilege associated

Sm J.D.M. DerrCtt, The Liaby of Deites i Pqy Taxer, 71 BomiAY LR. (JouiN), 38 (1969)[hereinafter DERRTT, Tax

LiaiMJ.
See 1 JD.il. Derrett, An Exanp of Tax Emion in AMesknwl adia, in ESSAYS IN CLASSICAL AND MODERN Hi N-Du Lw 250
(1976) [hereinafter DeRRr, Tax Evasion]. See ais NN. Kher, Tax Exemption in Anient India, [1963 Nio's HismRICAL

QUARTEItv

59.

bid. at 261.
"Id
'

*

See DeosErr, Tax Liahilly, srpra note 64, at 262-263.

According to Professor Derre, in the case of family Idols the cost of their worship in clothes and ornaments, and daily
pqja by a Brahman, could be (and still is) very small. The Idol's food consists of the savour of food cooked for the family
and placed before it. Its bath requires hardly any expenditure. If the shebtir so chose, he could attend to the Idol's 'needs'
at the meanest possible level, spending the remainder of the income on himself and the members of the founders family
at his discretion. Jer J.DM. DERRETT, INTRODuCTIoN To MODERN HINDu LAir 496 (§787) (1963) Ihereinafter Dr.isnrrr,
MODERN HIND. JLW]

For instance, in Rama Rao . Board of Comars., FIR, A.LR. 1965 SC. 231 the aorhakar (priest) demanded half the
offerings made at the temple. Another famous instance is in the Dahkor Teorph Care, Manobar Gntrh -Tambekar v.
Lakbmiram Gsindram, (1888) L.R 12 Bom. 247, where the shebaits claimed that the presents brought by worshippers to
the temple, once in their hands, were personal presents and belonged entirely to them- In other cases pqimis (priests) have
claimed to be the real iebairs of the temple, re Shabodv. Raja Ram, AI.R. 1965 S.C 254.
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with such misuse of religious beliefs." Professor Derrett brilliantly sums up the law and intent behind
the debutter properties as, ,". (the dbtes> erved the same purpose as an wznestment, permanent as to eapital
and ble as to emloyment of income. "' As a consequence, Idols were termed as 'income-earner;for their
heads of mats hare
managen."' In 1960, the Hindu Regou Endowments Commiion commented that
The properties held by the Idols
become essendal4 world# and... (sometimes) corrmpt and imml.
continue to be significant in value. As of date, the property held by the Idols in the State of Tamil
Nadu alone are said to run into crores of rupees? All these aspects have resulted in significant law
reform that has tried to change the oudook of tax law towards religious endowments so that the
personality of the Hindu Idol is not taken advantage of. On the flip side, this modern-day law reform
has not, in many instances, completely understood the ancient personality of the Idol resulting in
sorne anomalous consequences.

B

The Idol and Income Tax Law: Can God be Taxed?

As stated earlier, Hindu custom and subsequent colonial legislation, principally the Income Tax Act,
1922, gave significant tax concessions to property held by deities. The Act was made inapplicable to
any income derived from a trust, business or voluntary contributions that was applied for religious or
charitable activities The Income Tax Act, 1961 did away with this liberal attitude- The 1961 Act
broadly provided that exemptions would be given only upto twenty-five percent of the trust's
properties. Moreover, the exemptions were inapplicable if the income from the property was to be
used for a private religious purpose not benefirting the public, or if the income from the properties
directly or indirectly benefited the author/ founder of the trust or the relatives of such persons.

SleeDsr-rr
Rrusnx & Lar, saqn note 24, at 496-491 Hindus, it is said, are indifferent to the nieaprzarlsplThis refers
to the defat/ vesting of the propertes in the sAdil. Any spintualy tunded Hindu is said to be benign to the possibility of
iax woidance or abuse by die shrbail as result of the endowment. This is because the spirnmal benefit accruing fronm the
endowment to God happens at the stage of risarge or rentnciation/release of the interest of the endower in the property
endowed. Any subsequent happenings would not affiect the spiritual beneri
aiready obtained Also, as will be discussed
later, the shekrill is said to involve mne real interest in the propert as opposed to a mre interest in the office. Therefore,
their mismanagement or misuse should not be construed as sacrilege. Se genal4 JDM. Derret. Tk Concept qf Properiy it
Anent ildian Them7 and Pzaicy, AT.R. aous.) 2, 5 (1968) [hereinafter DRRETT, Proply In AHmnIs fridial. Howeser,
Srikrishna, 3. disputes this coclusion of Professor Derrein While conceding that the act of snarxa releases the endower
interest In the property |RANusNiITT, IX.471, this, says Srkrishna, J., should not lead to the conclusion that the she/ak or
anyone else is free to misappropriate the debutter without any social or legal sanction ensuing for the same. Merely
because the endower has no interest does not mean that the shbuait had no duty to correctly iappropriate the pruperty os
VITT143 where it is stsed that ... Shoul
een that the gft itself cannot be invalidated. He places reliance on IMArLsussMInm,
/9s-la pereon

m0ne lia

ghw...."

Seeabo.

toanother fir a plarprirpose, the g0 shalt be

RAMA Jois, AxcrnrTINorAsN Lr

ioid if Tbe jf is not sedfir the purposefor uhl it YeI
ETmA. VA.Us iN MANS Suirm 70-71(2002),

DsEant, MooERN HiNDu LAw, .rpranote 68, at 496 (5787).
DERRETt,

Tia L;A/sl, in note 63, at 39.
HINDL REaGoicus EDo MENTSCOMMSSION
/b&Hindu RegioerEArIMents Comseions A.I.R. (oe.)

See REroRT ol THE

Report of
'

22 (1960-62). See general4Surnantrao C. Bhat, A lNs/s as the
98 (1964) |hereinafter HHAT].

Interview with a senior officer of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, Government of Tamil
Nadu, Chensnai, conducted in November 2002.
S.4(3}, Income Tax Act, 1922.
S811 &

a12.

Income Tax Act, 1961.

S.13, Income Tax Act, 1961
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Two issues have cropped up frequently with regard to the Income Tax law in its apphcanon to Idols.
The first question is whether by virtue of its position as a representation of God, a Hindu Idol can be
taxed by the State. The second question relates to the distinction between public and private religious
trusts These questions came to be considered in LT Commr v Jogendranad? The decision of
Mukharii and Laik,JJ. lay down some interesting propositions of law According to them, the Income
Tax Department was correct in taxing the properties of the Idol. However, the reasoning applied by
the two judges was very different. According to Mukharji, J. the Idol enjoyed full legal personality
Therefore, if the Idol were allowed to own property (although in an ideal way), to sue for it and to
obtain all the other benefits normally accorded to a natural person, there should be no reason why it
should not be taxed as a natural person would be."
On the other hand LaikJ. held that while the managers of the Idol could be taxed, the Idol itself was
not capable of being taxed." Laik, J.'s view amounts to holding that the Idol has only limited
personality. According to him, the )aridialprenonah of the Idol is only the technical means of developing

jurirticrelations betwe the seieml human behgs dfferent interestedin the institudon(s).' The almighty himself
(or herself) does not obtain any benefit from the property dedicated and cannot own the property.
Any benefit obtained from the debutter accrues only to those who manage the deburter. In his
opinion, according full legal personality to an Idol for income tax purposes would be tantamount to
building a fction spon afidon.'2 Therefore, his conclusion was that the almighty, as represented by the
Idol, cannot be a unit of assessment." Hence, any tax on the property of the Idol is assessed through
the managers of the property.
The opinion of Mukharji, J. has gained wider acceptance for two reasons. It has expressly been
accorded approval by the Supreme Court and is the law of the land.' Also, in general, courts have
tended to bring wider classes of persons, both natural and artificial (in particular, those that have been
created for the purpose of tax avoidance) within the tax net." For instance, the scope of the
'individual' who is liable to taxation has in numerous judgments been expanded to implicitly cover

AtR. 1965 Cat 570 [hereinafter }gnodranath).

'

Ii. at 582-583 (para 43).
I.
D

at 597-598

(pares 140-144).

IM. at 595 (para 125)
'

'3
A

A.R. 1965 Cal. 570, 595 (pars 128).
DERRET. Txy IoMbfh ssra otre

63, at 43.

In fact this view was specifically upheld by Ramaswami, J., when the matter went on appeal to the Supreme Court. Sew
Jogendratlhv LT Contwr, A.1R. 1969 S.C 1089, 1093. Seeaho Offinal Truste of Wr Beqlv CLT A LR 1974 S.C.
1355.
See the seminal opimion of the Supreme Court in, McDowdll Ca Ltd. v. CTO, AIR- 1986 $0C 649, [hereinafter
McDoawel, where the Court frowned upon all methods of tax planning and tax avoidance noring that these were violadve
of the income tax law However, McDoaeRl has come in for sharp criticism as recently as an 2003. In Union qf Inda %.
A!ad BacheAndolan, 20031 263 I.TR. 706, 753-763 (SIC.), in the context of the Indo-Mauriius Tax Treaty, Srikrishna,
J., notes at 760 ".nod en/yatahe privae in Dake of Westnner case (a case taking afaeurable rde of lax pning)b...ahr and
kicking in England,buit if also seems lo hae acqidredijcdealhenedean..- in Inda, nothstadwag the iewperar
tWhmlence created in
the ske of te McDoawll case ... '
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Idols. Courts have dismissed logical and cogent arguments that suggest to the contrary on several
occasions8

C

The Consequences of the Public-Private Endowment Distinction in Modern
Hindu Law

The distinction between public and private endowments also involves some interesting propositions
of law When a dedication is made to an Idol, are the debutter properties ipso facto intended to
spiritually benefit the entire expanse of Hindu worshippers or just the person(s) the endower
specifies? This issue is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, the answer to this question would shed light on
the very nature of the debutter properties held by the Idol, Second6, if an endowment is ipso facto a
public endowment or is specifically held so on facts, then the Idol can avail of some tax
concessions." These tax concessions have to however, be balanced against the possibility of State
interference in matters relating to public religious endowments."
In Jogendmnatb, Mukharji and Laik, JJ. were faced with a dilemma. 9 On one hand they felt that the
correct understanding of Hindu jurisprudence as embodied in the shastras could not allow for a
religious endowment to have a 'private' character.'90 According to Mukharji, J., "be (the almigby)
represents always a pubic purpose par excellence and the epitome thereof " This concept, according to the
learned Judge, represented an important contribution of Hindu Law to general jurisprudence.
Mukharji, I felt that the interference of Roman and Anglo-Saxon conceptions of law had caused this
contribution to be subsumed.' However, he considered himself bound by a significant body of
precedent that indicated the existence of a public-private religious endowment distinction in
contemporary Hindu law."
In fact, Mukharji,

J. could

not have been closer to the truth. The distinction between the two is of

"

See for instance, SriSidbarv. IT 3fflar AIR, 1966 Cal. 494. Here, it was argued that since the 1922 Act did not expressly
cover Idols while the later 1961 Act specifically did so, it must be held that Idols were not intended to be covered by the
previous enactment. The court did not accept this argument. The court was guided by the increasingly evident policy of
the State to tax an increasingly wider net of persons such as a University or the Bar Council. The court therefore felt it
was ustified in including within the tax net Idols also. See CIT v. Sat.Sodra Dai A.IR. 1957 SC. 832,

.

For instance, s.11 read with s 13(1)(a), Income Tax Act, 1961 provides that in respect of public oriented trusts a number
of items are excluded from taxation, such as the income derived from property held by the trust which is actually used for
public religious or charitable purposes.

*

For an instance of State interference in the management of the debutter under stacutes such as the Bihar Hindu Religious
Trusts Aci, 1950, seeState of Biber v. Chrila Dasi, AJIR, 1959 SC. 1002. Another instance is under the Nathdwara
Temple Act, 1959, where the ownership of the temple and all its endowments were vested in the Board constituted under
the Act c. Baj, sopra note 7, at 236

"

See DsnR-rr, Tax Lzabibt, supra note 63, at 42-43, for a brilliant exposition of this dilemma.
A.I.R. 1965 Cal. 570, 585 (parns 56-58), 597 (para 139).
Ibd at 583 (para 46)
Dbid. at 581 (pars 39), 585 (para 58)_

9

Sav for instance, Nargaanv. Gap4 A..R 1960 S.C. 100.

Sm

NIMAR RANJAN CHAKRAEORTY, COMENTAnR ON HINuU RETAGIOUS EaoaMrsENTS 117-118 (1986) |hereinafter
CHAKrARsonnR]. See aea A. Gios-, TRe LAw op ENmnowsrsN-rs (HiNou & MAuouata
) 140-141 (2nd edn., 1938) [hereinafter

GHosH-]
60
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recent origin and there is no authority for it in ancient Hindu law." Neither does any such distinction
exist in English law= Although English law recognises the distinction between a private and public
trust, this distinction is not applicable to a religious trust. Under English law, a private trust providing
for the material or spiritual benefit of individuals and families cannot rank as a charitable trust; it
must be public in its character to be so." In short, although numerous cases"s have opined on the
actual distinction between a private and a public debutter 7 those discussions are not relevant here.
What is relevant is that there is a valid distinction between a public and private debutter in
contemporary Hindu law. As has been discussed below, the consequences of this distinction are
significant for tax law as well as for the financial management of the debutter.
There is yet another dilemma for the courts as well as for the shebaitrand other persons interested in
the debutter, especially in private religious endowments. This dilemma is not helped by the fact that
the law has been unclear and reform has been unsystematic." The dilemma for the courts is that they
have generally favoured the Hindu family in revenue matters. For instance, courts are hesitant to hold
that a private endowment has been converted into a public endowment merely because members of
the public are allowed to worship such Idols." The purpose behind this is to protect the endowments
from interference by the State. Historically as well, private religious endowments have received
favours and concessions from the State and the King. Also, courts have been hesitant to interfere with
a private disposition of property in the form of an endowment.iii At the same time, however, courts

Slee C.E. CaoensMs, RmGious TRusTs: THEm DrvsLOPmENT, SCOa AND MEANING 19-39 (1954). See aso P.
GA1ENDRAcAOAn & RM, BAsHl, RK, MUK14HERJEA
ON THE HiNOu LAw op Racious AND CHARITABLE TUSTs 184 (4
edn., 1979) [hercinaftcr MtKHERA, HINDU TRUSTs 19791. Even Indian courts have recognised the difference between
Indian law and English law on the point. See Radbaeta Deb v. Coamr H.R.1E, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 798. There is yet another
crucial distinction between English and Indian law on the law of trusts that will be discussed later. Generally speaking, in

English law, a trustee is a legal owner of the trust pioperty but the beneficial ownership of that property goes to the
person or purpose for which the donor conveys the trust property Under Indian law relating to debutter, property vests
in the Idol itself. Subject to a certain aueat (discussed later) only right of possession and management vest in the sheball or
manager, The shebait is not a trustee in the sense of English law. See CHAKu.AsoRa, supra note 94, at 57-58. Therefore, the
proposal of Fircasato, spra note 31, that the English law of trusts be applied in relation to an Idol is inappropriate. In
this context see the comments of Mr. Ameer Ali in Vid Vanahi Thire a BalusamiAyar; (1920-21) 48 Ind. App. 302,
311 (PC.). Sre abs Gasi,supra note 94, at 268-270.
Courts have found it extremely hard to lay down 'hard and fast rules' to determine which debutter is private and which is
public; it being primarily a factual determination. See S.V GuPrn, HiNDu LAw INBarrs INIoA 842 (1947). See also Moti Dar
a .. Shabi, A.R. 1959 S.C. 942, 951; Sarjoo Prasadv 4dbr Prasad, A.IR. 1979 All. 74, 79; Radbakanta Del; v. Commr.
H.R.E., Ai.R. 1981 SC. 798, 800.
The aspects to be considered for differentiating between the two are elaborately discussed by Mukherjea,J, in his TAGORE
LAr LECunREs, see MUKEReJA, HINDU TRUs 1979, sspa note 95, at 184-194. The most acceptable distinction appears in
DokiNandan a Mrnrlidhar,AIR. 1957 S.C. 133, 140 where according to Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in a private religious trust
the beneficiaries are specific individuals who are ascertained or capable of being ascertained. In a public religious trust the
beneficiaries are the geacral public or a class thereof and they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainmentAlso, for whether the public worship the Idol as a matter of nh4; is an imporant consideration, see Bala Shankar Maha
SdbankarBhnaer v Chany Cowirsioner,AJ.R. 1995 S.C 167.
CHAsastrrY, supranote 94, at 129.
"

See GG. V NnarashiwaPrabbav Ast. Cownr. HR. & CE., A.I.IL 1977 S.C 1192,1193-1194, per A.C. Gupta, J.

SeeState of Uttar Prdeshvh a Banidbar A.IL.E

1974 S.C. 1084, 1091. Although this case did not strictly deal with Hindu

Religious Endowments, the Supreme Court felt that where a donor had determined a specific purpose, it was not upto
the Court to innovate and undo the determination of the donor.
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have been faced with increasing abuse of the Idol for tax avoidance purposes. Further, legislative
intent post independence has tended to indicate a preference for regulation of religious endowments,
in particular private religious endowments."' Thus, even at the expense of reducing the corpus
available for the Idol to a nullity (thereby adversely affecting the spiritual and -materialinterests of the
worshippers), the State has pursued the income and wealth of the Idol." The State would have
required the court to'freepropifrom be dead band and make itarniablekforpubc es b ay of reeume.""
There is, in other words, a conflict between historical concessions granted to Idols, the legal treatment
of private religious endowments in contemporary Hindu Law and the legislative intent post
independence.

The second dilemma is for the shebaits and other persons interested in the preservation of the
debutter. If the endowment were held to be a public endowment, the endowment would get several
tax concessions. The debutter would, however be subject to regulation by the State under a number
of legisintionsHA as well as being required to pay certain fees or other exactions to the Stare." In
contrast, as a private endowment, the sbebaits would retain their independence with regard to the
management of the debutter, but would not get the concessions applicable to public endowments."'
Moreover, the creation of a debutter for a deity in a public temple was designed to enhance the
prestige of the family and bolster up the class, group or sub-caste, which provides the managers,
p/ayrir or both.'" Generally speaking, contributions by the religious Hindu public are more in case of
public Idols rather than family (private) ones for the reason that the former would have easier access,
and provide the public with greater opportunity to perform personal devotions.
Nevertheless, this dilemma for the shebait is riot irresolvable. First#, the shebait would prefer to keep

SeeDiaRnrT, Raucio & Law, srays note 24, at 506. Here Professor Derrert writes, ".k
Stae has no cared to make omq
of the prink rst, and has on the cotrary so acted tiarits interaes are Aky to be edangend...."
Also, for insuince, .13(1)(a), Income Tax Act, 1961 provides that the tax concessions applicable to public endowments as
embodied in s.11 and s12 would not be applicable in respect of private religious endowments However, the manner of

posidveprosia for the prerwdn

regulation was never clear, especially for private religious endowments. Even the Hindu Religious Endowments
Commission did not deal with private religious endowments, and when it suggested reforms these were in respect of
public religious endowments. See CHalaAosnr, sepr nots 94, at 129. Srlnenrl4B Ar, na note 73.
"

This was a serious criticism of Mukhari, J's decision in Jagedranath. As a general principle, it was felt that taxing the
property of the Idol was anti-worshipper. Sir CuAntABoe, nepro note 94, at 94.

A Ind at

122.

So for instance under the Bibar Hindu Religious Trusts Ac, 1950 in Stakof Bhr- Chawib Dan A IR 1959

aid
*

Sm for instance, as.11, 12and 13,IncomreTax Act, 1961.
See Dranr, MoEm

HINov Law, spnr note 68, at 496-497 (§788).
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their Idol a family one rather than a public one for the reason that fiscal concessions applicable to
public endowments
are not sufficienty) to counter the downside-namely increased regulation by
110
the State of the endowment which would curtail their autonomy. .Second, even a family or private
endowment can attract the public to come and worship before the Idol without running a 'serious
111
risk' of being held as a public endowment. Therefore, it would be incumbent on the shebaits to be
able to attract the Hindu public to worship the family/private Idol by making access easier. This
would allow them to secure the contributions of the Hindu public just as public Idols do. Thir4,
courts have taken a sympathetic view of family Idols attempting to get income tax concessions (and
tax planning in general), noting that these measures are not decisive to judge whether or not the Idol
was a public Idol.

D

The Personality of the Idol, the Shebaiti and Maintaining the Debutter: Legal
Gymnastics?

The juristic personality of the Idol has yet another practical implication with respect to the corpus of
the debutter itself. The underlying problem appears to be applying the ancient dual personality of the

U
Under
s.11 and s,12 read with s.13(1)(a), Income Tax Act, 1961, the following incomes of public trusts are exempt from
tax: (a) income in the form of voluntary contributions towards the corpus of the trust, (b) income derived from propcry
held under trust, (c) profits and gains of an eligible business, ie., business which is incidental to the attainment of the
objects of the trust and separate books of accounts are maintained in respect thereof, and (d) capital gains arising on
transfer of a capital sssec with some additional conditions.
L

Under ..11 the exempoon is not total, but only in respect of certain income of public trusts, viz., (a) the exemption is
limited to the extent to which such income is applied for charitable or religious purposes. In other words even if a
reasonable part of the income of the Idol is expended on the shebaits, that part would not be exempt from taxation.
Therefore, the shcbaits thernselves would not be able to avail of the tax benefits accruing to public Idols. (b) Also, where
the income instead of being applied, is accumulated or set apart for application to such purposes in India, the exemption
shall be available to the extent to which such accumulation does not exceed fifteen percent of the income from such
property.

"Sue general Bibaer Sta Board of Rel*i/es Trust v. Palal Ld, A.I.R. 1972 S.C 57. Generally speaking, if the endowment is a
public one, its books of accounts would be liable to inspection or in respect of notable Idols such as the one ar TirumaiaTirupat the endoawment may even be directly administered by a member of the civil services etc,
Seegeneral Babe Bhagan Din v. Gir Her Sarmop, (1939-40) 67 Ind. App. I (P.C.). Here, Sir George Rankin held that the
dedication to the public was not to be readily inferred when it was known that temple property was acquired by grant to
an individual or family. He also observed that the fact that the worshippers from the public were admitted to the temple
was not a decisive fact, because worshippers would not be turned away as they brought in offerings and the popularity of
the Tdol among the public was not indicative of the fact that the dedication of the properties was for public. However, if

the public were to come end worship the Idol as a mauer of right then the situation would be different and the Idol
would be a public Idol, see also Bal Shankar Maa ShankarBhaljee v. Cbady Commissioner, A,1.R. 1995 S.C. 167.
2

In Bibar Siat Board of Relsgious Trrt v Palat l,*4 A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 57, 60 (parn 9), Hidayatullah. CJ, notes that, -... Ihal a
person de sith a mew lt claiming exenpionfj r income-lax orfor that matter, agnadttealincome-tax i not decidve of the atere of the
endowant, The maton of th endowment is to be disovred ony from the tenor of the document by which the eadownvent is created the
dealags of the pidic and the condsect and babits of the peopk who ahi such a temple.. the claim to exemption was ath a niew to 5a'ing
smE income of th6e tndwed proparly.. it megl have ben modiatedfrom other considerations and not that it us a purbic endowment.
While this dictum evidently runs contrary to the letter and spirit of Chinnappa Reddy, J's speech in McDowell it is bolstered
by the recent observations of the Supreme Court in the Indo-Mauritius Tax Treaty case, Union of Indie v. Ayad Bachao
Anden, [2003] 263 I.T.R. 706, 753-763 (S.C.). Here, Srikrishna, J,, notes at 762, ".f
the courtifnds that notilbtis ng a
senis of kgal steps taken by an assesse, te intended legal rent/ bas not besn achieved, the corrt may be justified in oeraking 1m
intermediate sttp.s, ba t would not be permisiibkfor Ae comr to treal the intervening legal steps as non et based epfan same hgpotheical
assesmentIof the 'lralmaiw" of the assessee.../he coert must deal ith what is lagible in an objective manner and cannot afford Jo ciuse a
wial-o' the wisp..."
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Idol to a modern day legal environment that may not fully grasp the special nature of the Idol's
personality. As has been discussed earlier, the English law of trusts is not strictly applicable to arn
endowment to an Idol. The Idol is the real owner and not merely a beneficial owner. Thus, the legal
status of the rhebait (the natural person(s) associated with the debutter and required to render 'service'
or sheba to the Idol) is unclea Since he is not the owner of the debter, he does not strictly fall into
the category of a trustee. On the other hand, in view of the obligations and duties resang on him, his
position is analogous to a trustee and he would be liable for rMisadministration as well)" As will be
explained below, the shebait is not merely a manager because his interest in the shebain is not only an
interest in the office but also an interest in the properties of the IdoL Therefore, the legal status of
the shebaift sheds light not only on the legal personality of the Idol, but also has practical implications
for the properties of the Idol.
The proprietary interest of the shebait in the debutter was clearly enunciated by B.K. Mukhejes,
dictum in the leading case on the point, Angarbala v. Debabrata, 14 where he states:

J.'s

",..though a shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the technical sense, it would not be correct
to desaibe the shebaitshi as a mere oe. ... the shebait not on# bas duies As disbarge in
connection with the endowment but he has a benefidd interest in the debuter propery.. in albost
all. .endowments the shebait has a share in ite usmfract of the debutter property which dependr
spon the terms of the grant or Apon custom or usage... ern shere no emoluments are attached to
the office a] shebit, he enjoyr some sort of nght or interest in the endowed propery which
partially at least has the character of a property nit.. hoth the elements of ofice and property
are mixed up and bleded togethr, and one of the elements cannot he detached from the
other.... #
There have been suggestions that the property aspect of the shebai should be changed."" However,
despite a few contrary opinions," it is now setded that the shebait 'is not a mere office but is an amalgaw
of office andppery.'"' Therefore, as immovable property it can be gifted to another Hindu"" and has

Vidy Varnbi Thirtheav. BarsamAjar (1920-21) 48 Ind. App. 302, 311 (P.C.), per Mr. Amener Ah. SeeGHos5,
94,1a 267. .Se also the authorities

cited in

supra note

CHAKRABORTY, rfnfranote 94, at 139-142.

"

A.I.R. 1931 S.C. 293 |hereinafter Agrgdil].

"

Mid, at 296 (para 1l).

per BK Mukherjes, J The importance of the skaia to the very notion of a Hindu endowment or

debutser is noted by the classic author, GnosH, -apa note 94, at 276 who believes that an endowment attaches to the
office and not the office which is attached to the endowment since there can be a shvhwawithout endowed property but
nor vice versa.
"

For instance, seeREvorT or TE
note 62, at 91-92.

-hND

Riuroa s ENDOc

serTs CoMnssioN 173-194 (1960-62). See also SARKAR,

aprt

Se for Instance Sanuaa, spr note 62, at 91-94 where it is argued that a series of precedents that have suggestd to the

contrary have either been miinterprered or ignored while arriving at the conclusion that a rheiad carries with
proprietary interest in the debutter.
""

it a

aSrOsrC ro. A.LR. 1979 S.C. 1682i 1686; Shamb v Lad/i Hadha Chba Madan Gpa A.LRs 1985
SC. 905. 909-910. While the Ansrbala case was the first to unequivocally state the principle, it should not be taken as the
Jo Profle Charon

first authority on the point Earlier cases such

as

Moehar Make

v. Bhapendraab, (1933) 60 I.L.R. Cal. 452 (FA.), also

asserted this principir
Smopinion
V
if DesaiJ, in Raw RatA

v Bgonw L4A, AI.R 1978 SC. 1393,1397.
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even been attempted to be mortgaged."' As per B.K. Mukherjea, Js dictum in Angrbala, the interest
of the shebait in the debutter properties is (i) 'inherent in the shebaiditself and (ii) may also arise from
the 'terms of the endowment, customs or usage.
A dedication or endowment to an Idol may be partial or absolute. In an absolute dedication, the
endower surrenders all of his rights in the property endowed, while in a partial dedication the
endower retains some rights. On the death of the endowier, the interest in the debutter of the
endower passes to his heirs. Therefore, it was held in Pran Krisbea v. Controler of Estate Duy 2 1 that
wherever the deceased retained a right and this can be the subject of valuation, the right of
enjoyment has the effect of making the capital part of the estate of the Idol liable for assessment
for estate duty." Although estate duty is no longer levied, as a general principle it poses some
difficulties. Therefore, not only is the income of the Idol subject to taxation under the income tax
law but because of the peculiar modern interpretation of Hindu law (where the shebait is also
possessed of a property right in the debutter) the estate or the corpus of the Idol's property is also
liable for taxation.12 3 The logical conclusion of the ratio in Pran Krishna is that the whole of the
property of the shebaitspecifically retained by him in the debutter would eventually be taken in estate
duty after the last of the shebaits dies." Generally speaking, this is sound for the reason that it helps
reduce tax avoidance by not allowing shebaits to retain significant interests in the debutter and yet not
be taxed for it.
There is yet another problem about the juristic personality of the Idol, the full implications of which
have not been fully considered by the Pran KIishna bench. Even if the dedication is absolute, the
office of the shebait is said to possess an 'inherent' proprietary interest in the debutter. The logical
conclusion of this proposition is that in "every' debutter, the shebait would be said to possess an
interest over the 'entire' debutter In terms of estate duty, it would be devastating for the debutter as
the whole of the debutter would be liable for tax since the entire interest of the shebai (the entire
debutter itself) would be deemed to pass on his death."' In fact, this modern day consequence of the
ancient personality of the Idol was not expressly excluded by the Pran Krihna bench."' Some later
decisions of the Supreme Court, recognizing the unfortunate but serious consequences of the dual
personality of the Idol, have attempted to reconcile this by saying that if the interest reserved was

S&- for instance, Mlahamya v Haridas,AIR. 1915 Cal. 161. However, it is not property in the conventional sense of the
word, but an 'amalgam of office and property', and there are some restrictions on its transfer, see the authorities in
CHAKRABORTY, -upra note 94, at 145-154 that discuss many of these restrictions.
.AIR.1968 Cal, 496 [hereinafter PranItishna].

Id See ss.10 & 12 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. See ekthe critical analysis in DERRET, Tax Liabp

sapra note 63,

at 43-

44.
DsanErr, TI Lbia4,spra note 63, at 44.

See DausaEr, Tax Liabily, supns note 63, at 44-45,
AIR. 1968 Cal. 496, 503, per Banerjee, J. However, these statements were only obiter; as on facts the High Court had
found that the settlor had expressly retained a portion of the property for his own use.
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collateral and not express or implied, such endowments would not be subject to estate duty." In that
case, only that portion of the debutter expressly or impliedly (not inherently) reserved by the settler
of the endowment would be liable for taxation. This approach needs to be further explained.
On one hand, the logical consequence of the Angurbala principle leads to the virtual loss of the
debutter over time due to taxation. While on the other, there are three sets of different arguments
that would support a contrary view. Thefirst is the force of equity that suggests that anything done
contrary to the wishes of the settlor or virtually negating his/her wishes is to be avoided. Semcnd, if
the debutter or other properties held by the Hindu Idol were detrimentally affected, that would
prejudice the interests of the religious Hindu community. This may be an undesirable consequence.
Tbirdl, the possible extreme consequence following from Angurbala and Pran Krtbna would run
contrary to Hindu law and history, both of which evidence considerable patronage and support to the
properties held by the Hindu Idol. The decisions of the Supreme Court cited above, while not strictly
logically coherent, seem to provide a way out. It appears that logic may have to be sacrificed at the
altar of equity and the need to avoid the virtual destruction of the practical utility of the legal
personality of the Idol.
IV

Conclusion

The dilemma with which this paper began was that while the personality of the Idol seemed to be
settled in law, its theoretical justification seemed unclear. The problem seemed amplified because of
the existence of two, not always complementary, legal systems-the native Indian legal system and
the English common lawm However, the problem of the Idol's personality is not impassable. Despite
formal recognition, in the sense of modern law, coming only with the introduction of the common
law into India, Hindus always seemed to consider the Idol as a person. Therefore, in Hindu legal
philosophy the justification for the Idol did not need state sanction and relied more upon the
collective beliefs of the Hindu religious community. Classical Hindu law seemed to attribute a 'real
will and real mind' to the Idol, which were expressed through certain natural persons, namely the
shebaits. Despite numerous efforts directed at this end, a perfectly satisfactory theory of the
personality of the Idol seems elusive. Despite the absence of certainty on the point, the personality
of the Idol broadly seems to conform to the realist school of legal personality However, the
theoretical underpinnings of the personality of the Idol are only a part of the problem.
Pigeon-hole adherence to legal theories serves little purpose. While there may be heated debates on
the theory of personality, the motivating factors for according personality to persons are always social
and economic," This issue gains importance in light of the fact that significant administrative and

"

See D/ti Neojae Sivar v. Contro/er of Estate Duty AIR. 1988 S.C. 1511, 1517-1518 (paras 12-14), per Venkatachalia,

J.,

whose observations in this concext are probably nere obikr See general4 Cotroller of Estate Day v. AahanI Umeth Nuranu
Pun, (1932) 2 S.C C 303, 308-309 and Salyanarayan Bagk
hv. Controller of Esktte Dul; [1982] 133 t.T.R. 710 (Cal.). See ara
CIT. v. Kokila Devi (1970) 2 S.C.C. 10, 12-13 (paras 8-9), where the Supreme Court commented that in the context of
the Income Tax Act, 1922, the notion that the shebai was property and that the shdait had an 'inherent interest in the
property' was irrelevant because on ters it had been established that certain natural persons did not have an express
interest in the property
SSeegenceral VD. Kuis-sutsmasra, LAiNDMARKS IN INDIAN LEGAL Hismaoy
S See generai
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legislative difficulties have arisen in respect of tax, property and trusts of the Idols. Not only do Idols
exercise considerable religious influence upon the faith of their believers, their increasing financial
standing also makes their study even more pertinent. The need to closely regulate the exercise of this
legal personality conferred on them has been felt for close to a century However, a number of
practical difficulties arise in this context. These issues arise from the fundamental uncertainty
surrounding the legal relationship between the Idol and natural persons, predominantly the shebaits.
The conundrums arise from the conception of natural persons having a real and material interest in
the property of the Idol While tis may not have been a problem for classical Hindu law, the
problem is very real for modern legal systems. In fact, it may not be possible to evolve a logically
coherent solution to the problem as long as strands of classical Hindu thought and the common law
operate in tandem. This problem was seen prominently in the context of imposition of taxes on the
properties of the Idols. " The path of logic on one side and religion and equity on the other is in
many cases divergent. The Courts have had to make difficult choices between equity and logic. As the
law stands now, there may not be an easy way to reconcile the two. In the end, either Hindu religious
custom or the common law will have to give way

In fact, while this paper has not attempted an examination of the applicability of criminal laws to Idols it would appear
that the appbeaion of such laws would raise further difficult questions. Such a discussion is quice percinent since an Idol
is subject to numerous regulatory and fiscal statrtes such as the Income Tax Act, 1961 which provide for criminal
prosecutions in many circumstances. The liability for
entities under several of these statutes is independent of the
liability of the natural persons, such as Directors or sheha, who may be prosecuted separately Therefore, can one
prosecute 'God' (or at least the physical representation of God) for a criminal offense? Even if a conviction were secured
would is be possible to physically detain or iuprison a lunsue entry (a question answered in the negative by the Supreme
Court in Vdskappa Tealiki? Even if one could physically detain a ssone Idol (as opposed to, say other juristic entities such
as corporations) would iac serve any purpose? These questions, Ahough pertnent, remain unanswered here
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